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Many people believe that during the last 15 or 20 years, 
countries around the world have tended to move toward 
parliamentary government. Dictatorial governments in var-
ious countries of southern Europe, Latin America, and 
Asia have been replaced, mostly through negotiated 
change rather than outright revolution, by governments 
which have at least nascent parliamentary institutions. 
Why such a widespread change in the form of govern-
ment should occur throughout the world during a span of 
time so relatively short is something of a mystery. Here, 
I consider to what extent the change reflects a shift of the 
balance of power from the beneficiaries to the victims of 
dictatorship and to what extent it reflects an adaptation 
that is to the mutual advantage of both sides. 
The commonsense way we are used to thinking about 
dictatorship and parliamentary government disposes us to 
emphasize the shifting balance of power. This balance-of-
power theory posits that a transition from dictatorship to 
parliamentary government is tantamount to a seizure by 
the people (or at least by a class of the people) of property 
that has previously been held by the dictator. In fact, as 
historian William McNeill (1982) has argued, changes in 
the technology for either the seizure or the defense of 
property—particularly changes in military technology— 
can help explain part of the broad historical pattern of the 
evolution of political organization. 
The balance-of-power theory is only a partial explana-
tion, though. Consider its limited relevance to one coun-
try's recent experience that it might superficially seem to 
explain particularly well. In Argentina, a dictatorial gov-
ernment by military officers was forced from power soon 
after having suffered a humiliating military defeat (the fail-
ure to recapture the Falkland Islands from Britain). One 
might argue that, when the Argentine armed forces were 
weakened by this defeat, the civilian population seized the 
opportunity to overthrow the military government. The 
problem with that argument is that little real damage had 
been inflicted on the armed forces. Primarily, the defeat 
caused a serious but intangible injury to the political pres-
tige of the dictator. Its effect seems to have been to provide 
clear proof of what many people who had initially support-
ed the dictatorship had already come to suspect: that this 
set of institutions was so blatantly inefficient that even the 
sectors of the population favored by the dictatorship would 
be made better off by a transition to democratic rule. 
If the balance-of-power theory is not a complete theory 
of changes in the form of government, then we have a 
problem. We would like to think of social, economic, and 
political institutions as arising from people's attempts 
(sometimes cooperative and sometimes individually self-
regarding) to be well-off in a particular environment. 
When the nature of a society's environment changes, then, 
we should expect to see a social response of institutional 
change, including change in the form of government. We 
would like to adopt this notion of social response as a gen-
eral theory of change in the form of government. However, 
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if we concentrate on the sort of environmental change that 
is most obvious as a cause for governmental change—that 
is, tangible change in the technology for the seizure and 
the defense of property—then we will remain far from be-
ing able to explain the events in which we are interested. 
Either we must give up the hope of explaining change 
in governmental form as a consequence of change in the 
environment or else we must broaden the category of 
events in terms of which we are willing to explain govern-
mental change. In this paper, I will argue for the second 
alternative. Specifically, I will argue that environmental 
changes concerning the distribution of information and the 
provision of incentives, as well as changes concerning 
technology in a narrower sense, can explain changes in the 
form of government. 
I will begin by outlining a theory of how a change in 
the form of government can occur as a response to a 
change in the information structure of a society's environ-
ment. Then I will demonstrate how this private-informa-
tion theory can explain a historical event of great impor-
tance, the transition from feudalism to a primitive form of 
parliamentary government in 13th-century Europe and, 
specifically, England. I will consider the discussion by J. 
C. Holt (1992), an eminent historian of medieval England, 
concerning the provisions of the Magna Carta that deal 
with taxation of the English barons. Holt argues that, in 
order to reduce their tax obligations, the barons in 1215 
should have required the king to make specific tax cuts, 
rather than focusing as they did on requiring the king to 
obtain their consent to new taxes. Consistently with the 
balance-of-power theory, Holt concludes that the barons 
made a serious strategic mistake by pursuing their proce-
dural approach. I will show how the private-information 
theory explains why the barons adopted their approach in 
1215 and why their descendants continued steadfastly to 
pursue this approach later in the 13th century, a continua-
tion which Holt's evaluation suggests must have reflected 
a perplexing failure to learn from experience. 
From Custom to Communication 
Political theorists use the term parliamentary government 
very broadly: to mean a form of government which in-
cludes a systematic arrangement to obtain the consent of 
the governed to the actions of the government. Parliamen-
tary government in this broad sense need not be govern-
ment by elected officials. Rather, parliamentary govern-
ment is government in which whoever holds power must 
describe publicly how that power will be used, and the 
people affected by such use of power must give their per-
mission for it. That is, parliamentary government is gov-
ernment that requires state action to be based on mutually 
voluntary, two-way communication between the ruler and 
the subjects. This is the sense in which I will use this term 
here. I will abstract entirely from the fact that consent to 
the ruler's action is typically a collective decision by a 
group of nonunanimous subjects. I make this abstraction in 
order to study the simplest possible version of the theory. 
Suppose, then, that a model has only two agents, a rul-
er and a subject. I will consider the relationship between 
these two agents in two environments, one without private 
information to be communicated and the other with such 
private information. I will show that an allocation of goods 
based solely on custom, and implementable without any 
need for communication between ruler and subject, is effi-
cient in the environment without private information. Such 
a customary allocation remains feasible in the environment 
with private information, but is undesirable from the per-
spectives of both ruler and subject. When private informa-
tion exists, that is, both agents prefer an arrangement in-
volving communication. 
First consider an environment without private infor-
mation. Suppose that every year the subject grows a crop 
of a certain fixed size. Suppose that the ruler does not pro-
duce anything, but that the ruler is more powerful than the 
subject and can seize part of the subject's crop—say, half 
of it—with impunity. The subject can defend half of the 
crop successfully, but by trying to defend anything more 
than that, will only suffer injury. In this environment, ei-
ther of two situations may occur. The subject may under-
estimate the power of the ruler, so that the ruler will seize 
half the crop by force and the subject will be injured, or 
the subject will voluntarily yield half the crop to the ruler. 
The history of such a simple society as this one will be 
brief. After an initial period of years in which the subject 
painfully comes to appreciate the full extent of the ruler's 
power, the subject will start to yield the crop without pro-
test as the ruler's customary right. Since no new informa-
tion will be transmitted after this customary equilibrium 
has been reached, the subject will thereafter bring the trib-
ute to the ruler without the need for any negotiation in-
volving explicit communication.
1 
Now consider a more complicated model which in-
cludes a third, less predictable agent than the ruler and the 
subject: a dragon. In some years, the dragon sleeps at 
'This intuitive analysis can be made rigorous in a formal model. Herschel Gross-
man (1991) analyzes one such model and provides some references to others. 
3 home, but in others, it awakens and invades the realm. 
This dragon is sufficiently powerful to abscond with the 
subject's entire crop. However, the ruler has a lance, the 
brandishing of which is sufficient to deter the dragon's in-
vasion. This lance is heavy, though; the ruler needs to eat 
two-thirds of the subject's crop in order to have the 
strength to brandish it. In fact, even to drag the lance from 
the castle to the subject's field is hard, unpleasant work. 
The ruler would rather stay at the castle and eat half the 
crop than drag the lance to the field and eat two-thirds of 
the crop, but would rather take this latter action than go 
completely hungry (as would otherwise happen whenever 
the dragon awakens).
2 Even with the lance, by the way, the 
ruler cannot seize any more than half of the crop against 
the will of the subject. 
Now let us add some private information to this model. 
Suppose that the ruler can see from the castle parapet 
whether the dragon is asleep or awake, but that the subject 
cannot climb this parapet. Knowing that the subject is ig-
norant of whether the dragon is asleep or awake, the ruler 
will be tempted to play the child-who-cried-wolf. From 
the height of the parapet, the ruler will call out, "Hark, O 
Subject! The Dragon has awakened! Please bring me two-
thirds of your crop so that I will have the strength to bran-
dish my lance. Be quick, or we shall both be famished!" 
You might think that the subject will be at the ruler's 
mercy when such an alarm is raised. The apparent choice 
is between relinquishing two-thirds of the crop and run-
ning the risk of losing it all. A clever subject can escape 
from this predicament, though, by replying, "Bring your 
lance here to my field, O Ruler. You are welcome to help 
yourself to two-thirds of my crop as soon as you arrive." 
If the dragon really is awake, then the ruler will hasten to 
the field, lance in tow. If the dragon is asleep, though, 
then the ruler will prefer to settle for having half the crop 
brought to the castle rather than having to work hard in 
order to obtain two-thirds of the crop. By replying thus to 
the ruler, then, the subject will induce the ruler to demand 
two-thirds of the crop only when surrendering such a large 
amount is in the subject's own interest. 
I contend that this imaginary ruler's bringing of the 
lance to the subject's field captures an important aspect of 
what occurs when an actual ruler relies on a parliamentary 
process to ratify action by the state. Consider carefully the 
several reasons why this metaphor is a good one. 
First, the ruler's bringing of the lance to the field is a 
form of communication. It is not intrinsically an act of de-
fense of the realm, since by assumption the lance can be 
brandished as effectively from the castle as from the field. 
Rather, the bringing of the lance is a credible signal that 
the report that the dragon has awakened is to be taken se-
riously. When it becomes an established arrangement that 
the ruler will bring the lance to the field whenever the 
dragon awakens, and that on those occasions the subject 
will voluntarily give two-thirds of the crop to the ruler, 
then the kind of two-way communication is occurring that 
defines parliamentary government. 
Second, the arrangement of having such communica-
tion is efficient.
3 That is, no other arrangement would be 
as good for both the ruler and the subject and strictly bet-
ter for at least one of them. This notion of as good for is 
an ex ante one that has to do with evaluating the outcomes 
of the political process both in years when the dragon 
sleeps and in years when it awakens. Also, the alternative 
arrangements to which this one is to be compared must be 
arrangements that would function despite the privacy of 
the ruler's information. Admittedly, communication is 
costly, and it could be avoided if the subject were able to 
observe the dragon directly. Since the subject cannot do 
that, though, such a comparison is irrelevant. 
Third, the communication arrangement can be strictly 
better for both the ruler and the subject than any outcome 
that could be achieved without communication. An ex-
ample of how this can occur is analyzed in detail in the 
Appendix. 
Fourth and finally, the general idea that communication 
tends to be a necessary feature of an efficient arrangement 
with private information does not depend on the specific 
assumption that the private information is held by the ruler. 
We could have formulated a different model in which the 
subject has the private information about the dragon and 
has the ability to defend the realm, although the ruler 
would still have the ability to seize half the subject's crop. 
In this alternative model, the ruler would agree to demand 
21 am assuming that the ruler can gobble two-thirds of the crop before the dragon 
arrives, but would not have time to gobble half the crop. If this assumption seems puz-
zling, it can be replaced with the assumption that the dragon would do some other sort 
of harm (such as scorching with fiery breath) to the undernourished ruler. 
3The study of efficient communication arrangements is the subject of the economic 
theory of mechanism design. The revelation principle for Bayesian allocation mecha-
nisms is particularly relevant here. This principle has been derived formally by Roger 
Myerson (1979) and Milton Harris and Robert Townsend (1981), among others. For 
simplicity, I follow them in neglecting arrangements that involve repeated communica-
tion. Consideration of such arrangements would not alter my main conclusions. Unlike 
the models in which the revelation principle has been proved, my model involves a 
costly act of communication. The ruler must actually drag the lance to the field because 
there is no way to make a binding commitment to brandish the lance in return for re-
ceiving two-thirds of the crop. Models of costly signaling were first investigated by A. 
Michael Spence (1974). 
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only one-third of the crop whenever the subject brings the 
lance to the castle. The efficient pattern of communication 
is somewhat different here than in the other model, but the 
general principle still holds: some communication must oc-
cur in order for an efficient allocation to be achieved in a 
way consistent with both the ruler's and the subject's in-
centives. 
Theoretical Standards 
So far, I have described two claims. One is factual, that 
during the last two decades many governments around the 
world have been transformed relatively peacefully from 
dictatorship toward parliamentary rule. The other claim is 
theoretical, that this trend can be understood at least in part 
as a response to changes in the informational environment 
of the countries involved. The fact that transitions have 
tended to be relatively peaceful is explained by the fact 
that movement toward parliamentary rule is advantageous 
to the sectors of the population that have formerly benefit-
ed from dictatorship, as well as to the population at large. 
Can the proposed theory actually explain the alleged 
fact that motivates it? That depends on what we consider 
explanation. I want to begin by discussing this conceptual 
issue, in order to lay the groundwork for what is to come. 
A simple standard by which to judge our theory is that 
it should let us tell plausible stories about informational 
changes in several actual countries. We need not be able to 
precisely identify or measure the informational change in 
any specific country. Rather, the cumulative evidential 
weight of all of these stories would be convincing evidence 
that the explanation of institutional change as a conse-
quence of change in informational aspects of the environ-
ment is a good explanation. 
According to fairly recent history, the private-informa-
tion theory seems to meet this simple standard. For exam-
ple, more than one candidate for the dragon has emerged 
to threaten various countries since the mid-1970s, dragons 
about which the rulers might have superior information to 
the subjects. One candidate, particularly relevant in the 
1980s, is the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In many 
of the countries where transitions of government have oc-
curred, the IMF previously had imposed conditionality on 
its loans. IMF conditionality required governments to lay 
off public-sector workers, eliminate subsidies to the pur-
chase of food, and so forth. Such unpopular measures were 
imposed as the outcome of negotiations between gov-
ernments and IMF representatives. Within a borrowing 
country, only high government officials were directly ac-
quainted with the facts about how uncompromising the 
IMF representatives had been and about how strenuously 
the government had sought to soften the IMF conditions. 
An efficient arrangement between the government and its 
subjects might well involve the government having to re-
veal credibly that the conditions imposed by the IMF were 
the best that could be negotiated in return for the loan that 
was received. Such credible revelation would be a role for 
which a dictatorship would be poorly suited. 
Another candidate dragon is the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which began to disrupt 
the international petroleum market with its embargo in 
1974. In many of the countries where transitions of gov-
ernment have recently occurred, state-owned enterprises 
had been among the largest of OPEC's petroleum consum-
ers. The incumbent governments of these countries, there-
fore, may have received private information about the 
prospects for petroleum supply and about contingency 
plans to maintain supply in the event of serious disruptions. 
(The sources of this information might have been both 
multinational petroleum firms and governments of friendly 
oil-exporting countries.) Various government policies— 
particularly involving foreign trade and nonmarket inter-
vention in capital-investment decisions—might be either 
wise or unwise depending on the content of this private 
information. Again, a dictatorship would be poorly suited 
to convey credible assurance to its subjects regarding the 
wisdom of such policies. 
A somewhat different way to explain contemporary 
transitions of government in terms of the private-infor-
mation theory is to rely on the alternative model men-
tioned at the end of the last section—that is, to assume 
that the subjects, rather than the ruler, possess private infor-
mation. One candidate for this private information would 
be the mass of information needed to make economic deci-
sions. A major theme of economic theory is that the com-
plexity of such information explodes in the process of eco-
nomic development. A dictatorial government might thus 
be able to do a fairly efficient job of running a relatively 
simple, less-developed economy on a command basis, but 
might become egregiously inefficient if its economy flour-
ished and became more complex. In Latin America espe-
cially, the economies of a number of dictatorships thrived 
in the 1960s and 1970s but stagnated in the 1980s. This 
pattern of growth followed by stagnation might be viewed 
as indirect evidence that the inability of a dictatorial gov-
ernment to elicit its subjects' private information became 
an increasing problem as growth continued and led to the 
5 dictatorships' downfall, just as the private-information the-
ory predicts. 
These stories are all plausible; nevertheless, they are 
unsatisfactory in three ways. First, they are all conjectural. 
For none of them do we have direct, documentary evi-
dence that someone had private information that could not 
credibly be revealed and that would have been efficient to 
have revealed. Second, these are all stories about private 
information concerning just one aspect of a complex envi-
ronment. Even if someone's possession of private infor-
mation were documentable ex post, then, this information 
would not obviously be important enough to explain a 
change in the form of government. Third, in these stories, 
except that a change of government follows the introduc-
tion of private information to the environment within a 
short span of time, we know of no specific connection be-
tween the change in information structure and the change 
in government. We would be more satisfied if, besides 
having a general idea that a parliamentary system is supe-
rior to a dictatorship as an arrangement for communication 
when private information is present, we had specific evi-
dence that people's awareness of the private-information 
problem had directly affected their thinking about how to 
replace the dictatorship. 
All three of these limitations are inherent problems of 
studying and evaluating historical evidence. Recognizing 
this fact, I do not want to formulate an impossible stan-
dard that a theory about the form of government would 
have to meet before it could be regarded as providing a 
good explanation. Rather, I will take the middle ground 
and formulate a standard more stringent than the weak 
one above, yet not so strict that it is self-defeating. 
My attempt to formulate such a reasonable standard is 
to confront the theory and the facts with three questions: 
1. Can we find at least one instance of a country where 
there is a strong presumption that private information 
of critical importance has begun to exist because of 
an event that can be dated fairly precisely? 
2. In this instance, has the event been followed within 
a fairly short time by a systematic, decisive move-
ment toward parliamentary government? 
3. Does an explanation of this instance in terms of pri-
vate information make the way that the transforma-
tion of government occurred seem less puzzling than 
it would otherwise be? 
If all three of these questions are answered in the affirma-
tive, then we should agree that the private-information the-
ory provides a good explanation (although not necessarily 
a unique or complete explanation) of the change to parlia-
mentary government. 
Explaining Medieval England 
Now I will examine a historical instance of transition to 
parliamentary government that seems to fit this more strin-
gent standard well. The instance is the governmental tran-
sition that occurred in England in the 13th century. 
Enter the Dragon 
Since I am using medieval England as a case study, let 
me begin by summarizing the relevant history (from M. T. 
Clanchy 1983 and Holt 1992). This history will establish 
that an event which can be dated fairly precisely changed 
England from an environment in which political actors 
lacked significant private information to one in which the 
ruler had private information that subjects considered to 
be of paramount interest. This is the first of the three crite-
ria for the private-information theory to meet the standard 
that I have articulated for the theory to provide a good ex-
planation of the emergence of the English parliament. 
The event in question was the capture in 1204 by the 
French of Normandy, which had been a fief, or feudal es-
tate, of the English king. The English effort to recapture 
Normandy failed decisively in 1214, with defeat in the 
Battle of Bouvines. The loss of Normandy as a buffer be-
tween England and France made England much more ex-
posed to foreign invasion in the 13th century than it had 
been in the 12th century. I will argue that, without this buf-
fer, the English barons had to rely on the king to warn 
them whenever the threat of invasion became serious. 
In order to compare England before and after the loss 
of Normandy, let's examine the period from William's 
conquest of England in 1066 to the end of the reign of 
Henry HI in 1272. This period begins at the point when 
Norman rule in England had evolved into a set of institu-
tions that historians would consider to be paradigmatically 
feudal, and it ends at the point when parliament had be-
come a recognized institution with well-defined member-
ship and structure.
4 (For an overview of the period, see the 
accompanying table.) 
King William I had been the Duke of Normandy when 
he conquered England, and his successors inherited both 
4For a period of 20 years, King Edward I (who reigned in 1272-1307) convened 
parliament at fixed times twice a year whenever he was in England (G. L. Harriss 
1981, p. 30). Although this custom lapsed for decades under his successors, parliament 
became an entrenched political institution in the 14th century, and by the end of that 
century it had acquired a settled membership and evolved into two houses. 
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Normandy and England as fiefs.
5 Through the first half of 
the 12th century, these rulers concentrated on ruling these 
two lands. In the second half of the 12th century, how-
ever, England became drawn into European politics to a 
considerable extent. King Richard I was the leader of the 
Third Crusade. In 1194 Richard became a vassal, or feu-
dal tenant, of Emperor Henry VI of the Holy Roman Em-
pire, and in 1213 King John became a vassal of Pope In-
nocent ID. This involvement in European military and dip-
lomatic affairs laid the groundwork for a situation in the 
13th century in which both the pope and the French king 
intervened directly and legitimately in English politics.
6 
An abrupt change in the position of English kings came 
in 1204 when King Philip Augustus of France captured 
Normandy. King John made a sustained attempt to regain 
Normandy, but he was defeated decisively at Bouvines in 
1214. Thereafter, England was exposed to the threat of 
invasion from across the English Channel by a powerful 
European rival. Indeed, such an invasion quickly occurred. 
Louis VIII of France invaded England in April of 1216. 
Although he was repelled the next year, for a time he held 
the southeastern part of England, including the ports of 
London and Southampton as well as several strategically 
important castles (Clanchy 1983, p. 199). Although France 
did not invade England again during the reign of Henry 
ID, the French continued to pose a direct military threat to 
England, as I will document later. 
This emergence of a military threat to England at the 
start of the 13th century was a situation exactly analogous 
to the entry of the dragon into the model considered above. 
England's 13th-century situation has two features that are 
particularly important in relation to the private-information 
theory. 
One is the serious risk in which this situation put the 
prosperity and security of the English barons. They would 
have clearly perceived this risk because of two precedents. 
Both following William's conquest of England in 1066 
and during the struggles which occurred during the reign 
of Stephen (1135-54) between the king and the supporters 
of Matilda (daughter of Henry I and Matilda of Scotland) 
and Henry n, the government of England had operated for 
some time by expropriation, plunder, ruthless suppression 
of resistance, and devastation of the countryside (Clanchy 
1983, pp. 45-46, 52-54, 119-20). Thus, although the En-
glish monarchy had faced military threats throughout much 
of the 12th century, the dragon that seriously menaced the 
barons did not emerge until 1214.
7 
The other relevant feature of the 13th-century loss of 
Normandy is the significant private information that the 
king of England would have begun to acquire about the 
imminence of external military threats to England. In the 
12th century, an invasion of England from across the En-
glish Channel would have been preceded by a conquest of 
the king's territory on the European continent. Then the 
English barons would have been required to raise an army 
for the king, so their information about the military situa-
tion would have been as good as the king's. After 1214, 
though, advance warning about an invasion would have 
come from diplomatic rather than military sources. The 
French could sail to England directly from their own terri-
tory (as they did in 1216). Henceforth, any advance infor-
mation would have to come from informants, knowledge-
able people who either were members of or dealt with the 
French court. Because of the growth of the European dip-
lomatic network during the 12th century, King John and 
his successors were in a position to receive some informa-
tion of this sort. Rather than giving up their wealth to the 
king on the basis of an undocumented assertion that this 
wealth was needed for defense, the barons would naturally 
want to have credible substantiation of the basis for such 
a request.
8 
Clearly, King John's military strength was seriously re-
duced by the irrevocable loss of Normandy in 1214. Thus, 
the balance-of-power theory would seem to explain why 
5At his death in 1087, William left England to one of his three sons and Normandy 
to another. Normandy changed hands among these heirs several times during the next 
two decades, but remained united to England almost continuously after 1106 (Clanchy 
1983, p. 66). The exception is that King Stephen did not control Normandy during the 
period 1144-54. 
6Pope Innocent III instructed the English barons to pay a disputed tax (the Poitevin 
scutage) in 1215 and annulled the Magna Carta in 1216. An ambassador of his succes-
sor, Pope Honorius III, gave papal authority to the coronation (of disputed validity) of 
Henry III and also attached the papal seal to the Magna Carta, thus overriding the ear-
lier annulment. King Louis IX of France accepted an invitation from both sides to me-
diate a dispute between Henry III and the English barons in 1264, and his ruling, which 
overwhelmingly favored the king, set the stage for civil war. 
7I am supposing that the consequences of the loss of Normandy took the barons 
by surprise. You might think that the 12th-century barons should have recognized that 
the loss of Normandy would imperil them, so that military threat to Normandy should 
have constituted a dragon. The response to this argument is that, before the fact, the 
barons would have thought that Normandy could not be held securely by the French 
even if it were temporarily captured. Clanchy (1983, pp. 189-90) notes that King John's 
expedition in 1214 was his second attempt to regain Normandy and says that the Battle 
of Bouvines "is generally considered one of the few decisive battles in medieval Euro-
pean history." That is, to have lost control of Normandy so completely that it could be 
used as a staging ground for a large-scale invasion was, indeed, a surprise. 
8Historian C. Warren Holiister (1986, chap. 15) discusses the diplomatic environ-
ment during the reign of Henry I. His work establishes that while some of the barons 
in the early 12th century had substantial information about continental affairs (and sub-
stantial involvement in them), on the whole, the king was much better informed than 
the barons were. The contrast in quality between the king's and the baron's information 
most likely would have grown even more pronounced during the following century. 
7 From Feudalism to Parliamentary Government in England 
Kings of England  Key Events 
Years of Reign  Name  Years  Event 





King William I used devastation of the countryside as a defensive tactic 
against threatened invasions. 
King William I commissioned the Domesday Book, a detailed survey of his English 
subjects. 
1087-1100  William II 
1100-1135  Henry I 
1135-54  Stephen  1139-53 
1144-54 
The government of England operated by expropriation, plunder, and ruthless 
suppression of resistance. 
King Stephen lost possession of Normandy to Geoffrey of Anjou; Henry II recaptured it. 
1154-89  Henry II 
1189-99  Richard I 
(the Lion-Hearted) 
1194  King Richard became a vassal of the Holy Roman Emperor. 




The French captured Normandy from England. 
King John repeatedly tried and failed to recapture Normandy (the last time, in the 
Battle ofBouvines), financing his attempts with new, severe taxes (notably, the 
Thirteenth of 1207and the Poitevin scutage). 
King John became a vassal of Pope Innocent III. 
The English barons seized London and demanded that the king obtain their consent 
to taxation. 
King John issued the Magna Carta. 
Pope Innocent III soon annulled it. 
The French invaded England, then were repelled. 





Pope Honorius III overrode the annulment of the Magna Carta, but deleted the key 
parliamentary clauses (12 and 14). 
A council of barons ruled England until the king came of age. 
New taxes required the English barons' consent, which was withheld on several 
important occasions. 
In the Provisions of Oxford, the English barons proposed a permanent parliament. 
The king swore to uphold these provisions, but did not. 
King Louis IX of France mediated a dispute between the English king and barons, 
ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the king, and civil war (the Barons' War) began in 
England. 
This war ultimately led to a political compromise between England's king and barons. 
1272-1307  Edward I  1287-1307  The king of England convened parliament twice a year continuously. 
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a transition in the form of government occurred shortly 
afterward. I shall argue later that such an explanation is 
much less satisfactory than an explanation in terms of pri-
vate information. What I have established so far is that the 
loss of Normandy in effect transformed the environment 
of England from one without private information to one 
with private information. That is, this event transformed 
England from a country resembling the first of the two 
model environments discussed above to a country resem-
bling the second. The fact that this transformation also in-
volved a shift in the balance of power does not conflict 
with my claim. 
How to Drag a Lance 
Recall my three-part standard by which to test the private-
information theory as a good explanation of change in the 
institutional form of government. That standard requires 
(1) a historical instance in which a precisely dated change 
has created an environment with private information, (2) 
a transition of government such as was contemplated ear-
lier that quickly follows this change, and (3) an under-
standing of the transition in terms of private information 
which makes the transition seem less puzzling than it 
would otherwise be. I have just argued that the loss of 
Normandy in 1204-14 by King John of England was a his-
torical instance that satisfies the first of these criteria. Now 
I will argue that this instance was followed by a transition 
toward parliamentary government, so that the second part 
of the three-part standard has also been satisfied. 
Notice that, between William's invasion from Norman-
dy and consolidation of power toward the end of the 11th 
century and John's loss of Normandy at the beginning of 
the 13th century, the government of England closely fit the 
model of government by custom that I outlined above. 
This is what would be expected if, as is being argued 
here, 12th-century England was an environment in which 
political actors did not have a substantial amount of pri-
vate information.
9 
Historians' descriptions of the character of the feudal 
rule that was imposed on England after William's conquest 
in 1066 emphasize the routine, predefined nature of rela-
tionships between ruler and subject. F. M. Stenton (in 
Clanchy 1983, pp. 83-84), in particular, has argued that 
services must be exactly defined in order to be feudal and 
that the "new precision which governed relationships 
throughout the higher ranks of post-Conquest society is 
the most obvious illustration of the difference between the 
Old English social order and the feudalism which replaced 
it." Another historian, Holt (1992, p. 112), adds that "cus-
tom and law largely consisted of routine procedure which 
had been hallowed by long usage. Occasionally it was re-
inforced by assizes or statutes produced by the king and 
his counsellors, but as late as 1215 there was still little 
enough substantive regulation to warrant the name of law." 
That is, political equilibrium involved a set of rigid expec-
tations regarding the exercise of royal power. The role of 
ongoing communication in government seems not to have 
been significant. 
As Holt's statement makes clear, claiming that 12th-
century English government did not involve any consulta-
tion with the barons would be too stark a generalization. 
However, the French seizure of Normandy did clearly in-
crease King John's awareness of his need to consult with 
the barons in order to obtain their consent to both taxation 
and military service. For example, he convened councils 
at Oxford to obtain the barons' assent to taxes that were 
levied in 1204 and 1207 (Holt 1992, pp. 319-22). The 
convening of such a council was still a discretionary ac-
tion by the king, though, rather than a mandatory proce-
dure for the levy of a tax. By the time of the defeat at 
Bouvines (in 1214), however, the barons were insisting 
that such a mandatory procedure be adopted. In May of 
1215, they seized the city of London to force John to ne-
gotiate with them. The outcome of this negotiation was 
the Magna Carta which John agreed to issue in June of 
1215. 
Clauses 12 and 14 of this charter are of particular inter-
est here. These clauses (translated in Holt 1992, p. 455) 
concretely specify the king's duty to obtain the barons' 
consent to taxation: 
No scutage or aid is to be levied in our realm except by the 
common counsel of our realm .... And to obtain the com-
mon counsel of the realm for the assessment of an aid . . . 
or a scutage, we will have archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls 
and greater barons summoned by our letters,... for a fixed 
date, with at least forty days' notice, and at a fixed place . . 
. . [The] business shall go forward on the day arranged ac-
cording to the counsel of those present, even if not all those 
summoned have come. 
The striking feature of these Magna Carta clauses is that 
they do not specify what is to be done (that is, how high 
the tax burden may grow) nor even precisely how that de-
9 William extended his informational basis for government in 1086 by compiling 
the Domesday Book, which was a detailed census, or survey, of his English subjects. 
The effect was to greatly diminish the privacy of subjects' information about their abil-
ity to pay taxes. 
9 cision is to be reached (that is, how deliberations will be 
conducted and which criterion, such as majority or una-
nimity, will be used to ratify an ultimate decision). Rather, 
clauses 12 and 14 resolve unambiguously and enforceably 
the specific issue of who is to be included in whatever de-
cision-making process will evolve. By enforceably, I mean 
that the king could not agree in principle to consult with 
the barons and then call councils on such short notice or 
with such secrecy or vagueness that some of the barons 
would be unable to participate, thus allowing the king to 
rule unilaterally by default. 
These clauses specify an explicit and permanent tran-
sition of the mode of government from one based on ful-
fillment of customary duties to one based on continuing 
communication to determine the relationship between ruler 
and subjects. That is, they specify a system of parliamen-
tary government. Consider exactly how this system would 
work in practice. Suppose that, corresponding to the drag-
on awakening in the model, the king were to receive 
warning of an imminent invasion. Such a warning might 
well require immediate action, so the king could not af-
ford to wait 40 days until the barons had met to agree to 
a tax. Therefore, the king would have to begin raising an 
army alone and later ask the barons for reimbursement of 
their share of the expense.
1
0
 This initial response to the 
emergency would be a costly signal to the barons, corre-
sponding to the action of the ruler dragging the lance to 
the subject's field. The barons could be counted on to co-
operate if the king were acting in good faith on information 
of a military threat, but otherwise the king's army expenses 
would be out-of-pocket. Thus, preparations to repel an in-
vasion would be made only when they were appropriate. 
This new arrangement was obviously objectionable to 
the crown, since clauses 12 and 14 were deleted from the 
Magna Carta on the occasions (beginning in 1216) when 
it was reissued. Their deletion did not settle the matter, 
though. The reissue of the Magna Carta was on behalf of 
King John's successor, Henry m, who was then a boy of 
nine. During the minority of Henry EI, which lasted until 
1227, the government of England was in the hands of a 
council dominated by barons (Michael Prestwich 1990, 
p. 23). Such a council continued to exist during the per-
sonal rule of Henry HI, and on occasion during this period 
the barons exercised their prerogative to refuse to submit 
to new taxes. As the private-information theory suggests, 
these refusals occurred when the king was unable to sub-
stantiate his claim that England was under military threat. 
This happened in 1242 when Henry En alleged that France 
had violated a truce with England and was about to launch 
an offensive campaign. In fact, Henry m was acting to 
provoke truce violations. The barons recognized this, ig-
nored his request for tax revenues, and instructed him to 
observe the truce strictly (Robert Stacey 1987, pp. 185, 
189-90). Again in 1253-54, the barons and knights large-
ly refused to honor Henry Hi's request for help to defend 
Gascony against an invasion. They were not persuaded by 
his claim that a threat existed, and in fact, no invasion oc-
curred, even though the army that Henry HI managed to 
send to Gascony was much smaller than the force he had 
requested (Prestwich 1990, pp. 98, 115, 118). In both of 
these incidents, Henry HI was forced to depend largely on 
his own resources to raise a sizable military force (Stacey 
1987, p. 199; Prestwich 1990, p. 98). 
Conflict between the king and the barons came to a 
head again late in Henry Hi's reign. In 1258 the king was 
obliged to swear to a set of proposals known as the Pro-
visions of Oxford. These proposals envisioned that a coun-
cil would meet three times per year on a permanent basis. 
(The term parliament was used to refer to these meetings.) 
The powers given to this council would have effectively 
transferred the government of England to an elected com-
mittee. Henry ID avoided putting the Provisions of Oxford 
into effect, and the Barons' War ensued. Although the bar-
ons were defeated militarily, the outcome of the war was 
a political compromise between them and the king. The 
characterization offered by one historian (B. Wilkinson 
1948, p. 163) is that "this [compromise] was an unex-
pressed but probably not unrecognized triumph of the fun-
damental political concept of government by counsel and 
consent. The final outcome was a transformation of the 
key institution of parliament. This concept and this institu-
tion were to lie at the heart of the great effort of political 
reconstruction undertaken by Edward I." 
In summary, the establishment of parliament was the 
outcome of a political process that lasted more than half 
a century. That process began with the forcible seizure of 
London by the barons; it involved the negotiation of two 
agreements (the clauses of the Magna Carta dealing with 
10The reliance of Henry III on his own army as the main force of an English army 
and his use of hired soldiers when a sizable force had to be deployed on a very short 
notice are documented by Robert Stacey (1987, pp. 186-87) and Michael Prestwich 
(1990, p. 103). To deploy a large army for any sustained period, though, Heray ID had 
to rely on the voluntary service of his barons and knights as well as on their consent to 
be taxed. When provision of this voluntary service was denied or delayed, the king's 
scope for military action was severely limited (Stacey 1987, pp. 190-91; Prestwich 
1990, pp. 103-8). 
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consent to taxation and the Provisions of Oxford) that were 
quickly repudiated by the crown through diplomatic ma-
neuvers; and before the process ended, a civil war (the 
Barons' War) had been fought. Nevertheless, especially by 
comparison with the reigns of William and Stephen, the 
period spanned by the reigns of John and Henry ED cannot 
be characterized as one of exceptionally bitter adversarial 
relations between the ruler and the people of England. The 
emergence of parliament can be fairly described as the out-
come of a cooperative process of institutional evolution, 
albeit of a process that evolved slowly and that was peri-
odically strained. Although this process was long, its be-
ginning can be dated precisely—and this date was imme-
diately after the transformation of England into a private-
information environment. That is, the emergence of parlia-
ment in the 13th century satisfies both the first and the 
second parts of my three-part standard. 
Illumination 
Now for the last part. I must show not only that the trans-
formation of England to a private-information environment 
coincides with the transition of English government to a 
parliamentary form, but also that paying attention to this 
informational transformation makes the nature of the gov-
ernmental transition more intelligible than it would other-
wise be. 
As I have mentioned, the loss of Normandy must have 
shifted the balance of power away from the king as well 
as created a situation in which the king had relevant pri-
vate information. Thus, it makes sense to examine the in-
telligibility of the governmental transformation in terms of 
a specific question: Does the informational transformation 
make the barons' demand in clauses 12 and 14 of the 
Magna Carta and the subsequent 13th-century evolution 
of the English parliament more intelligible than they would 
be if they were understood as consequences of a balance-
of-power shift alone? 
In fact, an eminent historian of the Magna Carta has 
found those clauses to be seriously puzzling. Holt (1992, 
pp. 321-22) takes the position that the clauses failed mis-
erably to achieve their intended purpose. He writes that 
In general . . . [clause] 12 was one of the least satisfactory 
or adequate in the whole Charter. It dragged in the novel de-
mand for consent to scutage . . . only to ignore the crucial 
developments in taxation of the last two reigns. It had noth-
ing to say of the new forms of taxation: of the attempts to 
assess taxation on land accurately, or of the far more vigorous 
and successful efforts to tax revenues and chattels. These all 
fell within the category of aids. Hence the Thirteenth of 1207 
[the tax levied in 1207 which was by far the most severe of 
John's reign, or of the whole century] would have come with-
in its terms. . . . Yet . . . [this tax] had been conceded 'by 
common counsel and the assent of our council at Oxford'. It 
had been lawful; and such taxation remained lawful after 
1215. The Charter made no provision to limit the assessment 
or to distinguish revenues from chattels or to determine meth-
ods of assessments or to restrict penalties for evasion. 
Here Holt seems implicitly to rely on the balance-of-power 
theory as an analytical framework. He judges that the En-
glish barons in 1215 made a serious strategic error in their 
negotiation with the king over taxation. In view of subse-
quent history, this attempt to reconcile the clauses of the 
Magna Carta regarding counsel in taxation with the 
balance-of-power theory by positing a strategic mistake is 
unconvincing. If the barons had made a glaring mistake, 
then they would have eventually changed their tack to ad-
dress the root problems that Holt identifies. But they didn't 
do that. When another constitutional crisis occurred in En-
gland almost half a century later, the barons continued 
along the same course. The Provisions of Oxford (in 1258) 
specified that a parliament would automatically meet three 
times a year to deal with questions of taxation (Clanchy 
1983, p. 272). 
Rather than simply disregarding Holt's judgment, 
though, let us look more closely at what lies behind it. Holt 
makes two specific arguments. One is that, on the basis of 
their experience with taxes in 1207, the barons should 
have seen clearly that the novel procedural arrangement 
on which they were insisting in 1215 would be ineffec-
tive. Holt's other argument is that the barons could have 
insisted, but did not insist, on substantive limitations of 
the king's authority to tax them. 
Holt's first argument misses an important difference 
between the status of the council that King John called at 
Oxford in 1207 and the status of a council convened on 
the basis of the Magna Carta. This difference becomes ap-
parent if we contemplate what would happen if the king 
and the council of barons were not to reach agreement. 
Under the status quo procedural arrangement, the king 
would assess the disputed tax and would rely on the au-
thority of a feudal superior to both himself and the barons 
(like the pope) for its enforcement. That is what happened 
in the case of the Poitevin scutage in 1214-15 (Holt 1992, 
pp. 228-31). The feudal superior in this position might at-
tempt to reach a negotiated settlement, but if the parties 
refused to compromise, then ultimately the legitimacy of 
li the tax would have to be judged on the basis of the cov-
enants that existed between the king and the barons. The 
fact that the king had called an ad hoc council of advisers 
and then had rejected their advice would not impair this 
legitimacy; the judgment of Pope Innocent ID that the bar-
ons must render the service required by the Poitevin scu-
tage illustrates this very clearly. In contrast, the Magna 
Carta was among the covenants that determined the legit-
imacy of taxation. If the Magna Carta stipulated that for 
taxation to be legitimate, not only must a council be called, 
but also its active consent must be obtained, then the king 
would be unable to count on the pope or on any other feu-
dal superior for enforcement of compliance with a tax from 
which such consent had been withheld. 
Holt's second argument does succeed in showing why 
the treatment of taxation in the Magna Carta is awkward 
for the balance-of-power theory to explain. As Holt's ar-
gument indicates, Richard I and John had considerably ex-
panded the traditional tax base by reassessing land, by in-
stituting taxation of revenues and chattels as well as of 
land, by introducing a customs system, and so forth. Rath-
er than relying primarily on a novel procedural remedy to 
limit their liability to taxation, the barons might have insis-
ted that King John accept substantive restrictions regard-
ing both what could be taxed and how heavily it could be 
taxed. Such a substantive solution to the problem of ex-
cessive tax liability would seem to have two advantages 
over the procedural solution that was adopted. First, the 
effect of a substantive limit on taxation would have been 
more reliable than the effect of a solution relying on the 
equilibrium performance of a deliberative political institu-
tion with incompletely specified rules. Second, by insis-
ting on the abandonment of novel forms of taxation rather 
than on the institution of novel forms of control over tax-
ation, the barons would have portrayed John as having 
overstepped the king's traditional authority rather than hav-
ing been themselves in the position of usurping the king's 
authority. Recall that Pope Innocent ED annulled the 
Magna Carta as it was issued in 1215 but that his succes-
sor Pope Honorius ID endorsed the reissue of the charter 
in 1216 from which clauses 12 and 14 were deleted (along 
with some other clauses which do not seem consequen-
tial). The popes do seem to have viewed the level of taxa-
tion in England as a matter about which the king and the 
barons could appropriately negotiate, but clauses 12 and 
14 of the Magna Carta as tending to undermine a founda-
tion of the feudal political order. Therefore, the choice of 
a procedural means rather than a substantive means to lim-
it the burden of taxation had the strategic cost of alienat-
ing the popes' support for the barons. 
In short, the balance-of-power theory can explain why 
the demand for consent to taxation would have been in-
cluded in the Magna Carta if the barons had lacked any 
way to define and legitimate substantive limits to their tax 
liability, but in fact, to include such substantive limits in 
the charter would have been easy. The balance-of-power 
theory thus cannot explain adequately why some particular 
substantive limits on taxation (such as limits on the taxa-
tion of chattels or on customs duties) were not incorporat-
ed in the Magna Carta, either instead of or in addition to 
the procedurally oriented clauses 12 and 14. We must look 
for another theory to account for the strong emphasis that 
the 13th-century barons placed on the procedural issue of 
consent. Unlike the balance-of-power theory, the private-
information theory does account successfully for that em-
phasis. The private-information theory thus meets the third 
part, as well as the first two parts, of the standard for ac-
ceptance as an explanation of change in the form of gov-
ernment. 
Conclusion 
The fact that parliamentary government was repeatedly 
proposed and ultimately came to be accepted, not just in 
England but also to some degree in other parts of Europe 
(Holt 1992, pp. 25-27), suggests that in the course of the 
13th century it had come to be recognized as an efficient 
political arrangement. Why was this arrangement increas-
ingly seen to be efficient in the 13th century, but not in the 
12th century? We have seen that this cannot be fully ex-
plained by the balance-of-power theory, but that it can be 
understood by also taking account of the fact that private 
information acquired a new strategic importance at the 
start of the 13th century. 
The Magna Carta and the Provisions of Oxford both 
required the ruler to consult regularly with subjects, but 
neither document spelled out exactly how. The efficient, 
incentive-compatible arrangements studied by Roger 
Myerson (1979) and Milton Harris and Robert Townsend 
(1981), which involve communication between agents in 
an economy with private information, seem to capture well 
the rough idea that the authors and negotiators of these 
13th-century political documents seem to have had in 
mind. In short, the private-information theory provides a 
notably more successful framework within which to un-
derstand the 13th-century transformation of government in 
Europe, and especially in England, than does the balance-





Like the contemporary pattern of transition from dicta-
torship toward parliamentary government, the 13th-century 
English transition exemplifies a trend that occurred 
throughout an international political system (Holt 1992, 
pp. 25-27). Considerations of private information may not 
have played as decisive a role elsewhere in 13th-century 
Europe as they apparently played in England. Neverthe-
less, based only on the experience of England, we can see 
that narrow considerations of the military balance of pow-
er are not likely to fully explain either the 13th-century or 
the contemporary patterns of transition toward parliamen-
tary government. Wherever these transitions occur, they 
should be understood as constituting arrangements to over-
come informational and incentive difficulties in attaining 
efficient allocations of economic and political resources. 
"in a recent paper written independently of this one, Yoram Barzel (1993) also 
notes the inadequacy of the balance-of-power theory to explain the political history of 
13th-century England. Barzel suggests that the emergence of parliament can be under-
stood well by analogy with the modem emergence of corporations in which share-
holders are voters. 
13 Appendix 
How Communication Could Be Better for Everyone 
In the preceding paper, I asserted that the allocation of goods re-
sulting from an arrangement with communication could be strict-
ly preferred by both the ruler and the subject to any allocation 
attainable in an equilibrium without communication. Here I dem-
onstrate this possibility in a numerical example. 
Assumptions 
Suppose that the subject's entire crop consists of 60 units of 
produce. The ruler can seize 30 of these units (half of the crop) 
unilaterally, but needs 40 units (two-thirds of the crop) to be 
strong enough to deter the dragon. Assume that the ruler is in-
different between consuming 40 units of produce after dragging 
the lance to the subject's field and consuming 20 units of pro-
duce without having to drag the lance; that is, dragging the lance 
costs the ruler 20 units of utility. Assume for simplicity that, 
after having consumed 40 units of produce, the ruler can bran-
dish the lance effortlessly (that is, without losing utility). Also 
assume that, if the ruler attempts to take 40 units of produce 
and the subject resists, then the ruler will only succeed in taking 
30 units, but neither the ruler nor the subject will lose utility in 
the struggle. 
Recall that only the ruler can observe the state of the dragon. 
After having seen whether the dragon is asleep or awake, the 
ruler takes one of three actions: 
h = Seizes a high quantity—at least 40 units— 
of the subject's crop. 
/ = Seizes a low quantity—30 units—of the crop. 
d = Drags the lance to the subject's field and 
requests 40 units of the crop. 
A strategy for the ruler specifies both the action x to take if 
the dragon sleeps and the action y to take if the dragon wakes. 
(Each of x and y denotes one of the three actions h, I, and d) 
Let x/y denote the strategy of taking action x if the dragon is 
asleep and action y if the dragon is awake. For example, l/d is 
the strategy of seizing 30 units of the crop if the dragon is asleep 
and dragging the lance (and requesting 40 units of the crop) if 
the dragon is awake. 
After having seen the ruler's action, the subject decides 
whether or not to acquiesce if the ruler wants more than 30 
units of the crop. A strategy for the subject is thus a set of rul-
er's actions that the subject will not resist. The subject has four 
possible strategies: {/}, {/,/*}, {/,d}, and {l,h,d}. Note that / is 
an element of all of the subject's strategies since the subject can-
not prevent the ruler from seizing 30 units of the crop. 
Assume that the payoffs to the ruler and the subject are sim-
ply the amounts of the crop they consume, less 20 units for the 
ruler when action d is taken. Whether the dragon is asleep or 
awake may influence what actions the ruler and the subject take, 
as well as the outcome of these actions (because the dragon will 
devour the entire crop if the ruler has not consumed 40 units.) 
Assume that the preferences of the ruler and the subject are de-
termined by expected utility. That is, the overall payoffs to each 
of the agents are determined by weighting the payoffs when the 
dragon is asleep and when the dragon is awake by the probabili-
ties of those events. Assume that the dragon is asleep with prob-
ability 0.9 and awake with probability 0.1. 
Outcomes 
The accompanying table presents these overall payoffs. Down 
the left side of the table are the ruler's possible strategies and 
across the top are the subject's. Each of the cells determined by 
a pair of strategies contains two numbers. The number in the 
lower left comer of a cell is the ruler's utility payoff, and the 
number in the upper right comer is the subject's. 
To see how these numbers are calculated, consider, for ex-
ample, the cell determined by the ruler's strategy d/h and the 
subject's strategy {/,/*}. The strategy d/h specifies that the ruler 
will drag the lance if the dragon is observed to be asleep and will 
seize the high amount of 40 units of the crop if the dragon is 
observed to be awake. If the ruler observes that the dragon is 
sleeping, but drags the lance anyway, the request for 40 units of 
the crop will not be honored because d £ {l,h}. Therefore, the 
ruler and the subject will each consume 30 units of the crop. 
However, the ruler will enjoy only 10 units of utility because 20 
units of lance-dragging disutility must be subtracted from 30 
units of consumption. The subject will enjoy 30 units of utility 
corresponding to 30 units of consumption. If the ruler sees that 
the dragon is awake and so seizes 40 units of the crop, the sub-
ject will not resist this seizure because he {l,h}. Thus, the ruler 
will have sufficient strength to protect the crop and will succeed 
in consuming 40 units of it, leaving the subject 20 units to con-
sume. These consumption levels coincide with the ruler's and 
subject's respective utility levels. Finally, the ruler's overall util-
ity level is the expectation (0.9 x 10) + (0.1 x 40) = 13, and the 
subject's is the expectation (0.9 x 30) + (0.1 x 20) = 29. 
This table defines a game in normal form between the ruler 
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Possible Outcomes in a Two-Player Game With Private Information 
Utility Payoffs From Alternative Strategies 
When the Subject Has a Fixed-Size Crop 
and the Ruler Has a Lance and Private Information 
About the State of a Dragon* 
= Nash Equilibria 
The Ruler's Strategy 
(Actions of the Ruler 
If the Dragon Is 
Asleep/Awake) 
Possible actions: 
h = The ruler takes a high level of the crop (40 units). 
I = The ruler takes a low level of the crop (30 units). 
d = The ruler drags the lance to the subject's field and requests 
40 units; dragging costs the ruler 20 units of utility. 
The Overall Payoff to Each Player** 
Given the Subject's Strategy 
(Actions of the Ruler That the Subject Won't Resist) 


















































































*Assumptions: The subject's crop = 60 units; the ruler can seize either 30 or 40 units of the crop and needs 40 units to deter the dragon; resistance from 
the subject leads the ruler to seize 30 instead of 40 units of the crop. The probability that the dragon is asleep=0.9; awake=0.1. 
"In each cell, the number in the lower left is the ruler's payoff; the number in the upper right, the subject's. 
15 and the subject * A Nash equilibrium of the game is a profile 
consisting of a strategy for each player which has this property: 
Each player takes the strategy of the opponent as given and 
chooses a strategy that maximizes the player's own utility when 
played against the opposing strategy. In the table, that is, for an 
outcome to be a Nash equilibrium, the ruler's utility level must 
be the highest one in its column and the subject's utility level 
must be the highest one in its row. [The sample strategy profile 
(d/h, {l,h}) just discussed satisfies this condition for the subject, 
but not for the ruler, who should adopt strategy h/h.] 
The game displayed in the table has five Nash equilibria. 
These are (h/h, {/}), (///, {/}), (/*//, {/}), (h/d, {14}), and (l/d, 
{14 })• The first three of these equilibria share the same payoffs, 
27 for both the ruler and the subject. None of these three equi-
libria involves the ruler communicating by means of action d. 
In them, the ruler's attempts to consume 40 units of the crop 
(by taking action h) are always resisted by the subject, even 
though in the first equilibrium the ruler sometimes wants the 
high level of consumption in order to defend the crop from the 
dragon. In the last two Nash equilibria, the ruler does obtain 40 
units of the crop if the dragon awakens by credibly communica-
ting the news of this event to the subject (that is, by taking ac-
tion d). In both of these equilibria, both the ruler and the subject 
enjoy the utility level 29, which is higher than the utility level 
27 that they each receive in any noncommunication equilibrium. 
That is, both the ruler and the subject strictly prefer an equi-
librium with communication to any equilibrium without it. 
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incomplete information. In the underlying game, there are two types of ruler, depending 
on whether the dragon is asleep or awake. Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game 
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